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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 001924

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SUBJECT: AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE HOLD EAC MEETING JULY 30, 2004

REF: A) THE HAGUE 1915 B) THE HAGUE 1913

(S/NF) 1. Post convened an EAC July 30 to discuss new developments regarding the Saudi/Somali surveillance incident and to discuss security procedures and requests to the Government of the Netherlands.

(S/NF) 2. The DCM commenced the EAC meeting by informing the EAC of the bombing incidents outside the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent. Turning to issues in the Netherlands, DCM stated that the LEGATT, who was scheduled to brief the EAC on new developments on the surveillance case, was still being debriefed by the Dutch prosecutors. The DCM stated that the LEGATT had informed him that some arrests had just been made and that the residences of the individuals would be searched later today. The DCM stated that the Dutch were making an effort to share information and requested various law enforcement sections to reach out to their contacts.

(S/NF) 3. ORCA briefed the EAC on the Saudi/Somali surveillance incident and stated that they had been informed that some arrests had been executed. ORCA stated that as of now, prior to searches being conducted, the Dutch were finding little grounds on which to hold the individuals and this would be a test of new Dutch conspiracy laws, which could allow for holding the individuals. COS stated that the their British counterparts had voiced their displeasure to the Dutch on the information sharing time lag and had compared the reporting casings and surveillance to the Northern Ireland incidents.

(S/NF) 4. The EAC reviewed the vulnerability of the Cotrolled Access Compound (CAC) being located inside the Embassy compound. The ARSO briefed the EAC about already-scheduled technical changes to the CAC, which would decrease the vulnerability.

(C) 5. The EAC reviewed vulnerabilities of the CAC in Amsterdam. The EAC concurred that visitors/applicants should be screened upon entering the exterior, before nearing the building. The ARSO will assign a Local Guard to the perimeter to hand wand visitors/applicants as an interim measure until the completion of the scheduled CAC relocation project. The ARSO will meet with the LGF Manager on Monday to discuss changing the security posture and LGF SOPs at the Consulate. NOTE: Post has requested additional LGF funding for an additional LGF position at the Consulate. The dramatic increase of DHS-mandated visa applicant interviews vastly exceeds the capability for which the current LGF staffing level was designed. The EAC concurs on the need for an additional Local Guard.

(S/NF) 6. The Ambassador briefed the EAC on his actions to request increased security. Over the last week, the Ambassador engaged the Deputy Director of the Dutch Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) encouraging real-time information enchanges and to ask that the AIVD provide a full briefing to the Mayor of The Hague and his senior staff. The Ambassador spoke with the Acting Director of AIVD today to request that post be allowed to liaison with the new couterterrorism coordinating group, termed the Couterterrorism Info Box, on a daily basis. The Acting AIVD Director stated that he would provide an answer on Tuesday August 3, 2004. The Ambassador spoke with the State Secretary of the Ministry of Justice to request assistance in

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moving forward with the anti-ram barrier issue on the South side of the Embassy. The State Secretary stated that upon the return of the Director of the Ministry of Interior Monday, the Ministries of Justice and Interior would try to work with the city to address the issue early next week. The Ambassador has been in contact with the Prime Minister's advisor for law enforcement matters to ask for assistance in moving the request. In a meeting today with the Ambassador and the LEGATT, the Chief Prosecutor for Terrorism indicated that there would always be a relation on counterterrorism issues and the U.S. and therefore she would do what she could to keep us advised on a real time basis and

would encourage the AIVD to do the same.

(C) 7. The DCM briefed the EAC on his actions to request increased security. On July 30, the DCM spoke to the senior Interior Ministry Official, Deputy Director General Lidewijde Ongering, stressing the urgent need to fast and full information sharing. The DCM emphasized that while it was clear that Dutch security officials including the Dutch Security and Intelligence Service (AIVD) were making an effort to improve, our experience was that once a case became a police matter, information sharing deteriorated. Specifically, we need to know quickly what names, phone numbers, and other information was uncovered by the arrest of the Saudi and Somali surveillance suspects. Secondly, the DCM asked for help in replacing the plastic traffic barriers alongside the Embassy with temporary concrete or metal "jersey barriers". Ongering replied that she had participated in a security review on July 28th to discuss the Saudi/Somali surveillance incident that had included an assessment of the Embassy's physical security. She repeated that the GONL's view is that "knowing what we know, the current level of protection is adequate and replacing the plastic barriers is not essential." The DCM replied that the problem is what we don't know, protection is inadequate, and that should there be an attack, the failure to address that obvious vulnerability would be inexcusable in hindsight. The DCM said the Embassy would immediately send a diplomatic note to the MFA and asked Ongering's support for a central government decision to override local authorities and install the barriers. Ongering promised only to "take another look at the matter". Ambassador Sobel also contacted the Secretary General of the Ministry of Justice to request information with the intention to get quick action on the matter. The Ambassador intends to meet with the Minister of the Interior when the Minister returns from vacation if the action has not already been taken in response to the anti-ram barriers.

(S/NF) 8. The DCM contacted the new Dutch Counterterrorism Coordinator, Joustra, and the DCM made the same pitch. Joustra promised that he would try to be helpful on both counts and promised to telephone the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Coordinator, and contacts in the prosecutors' department. He agreed that it was essential to keep information flowing, particularly once the police and prosecutors became involved. Joustra described the current situation as "growing quite seriously" and made clear he was not yet satisfied with the handling to date. He indicated he was in touch with the Prime Minister's advisor for law enforcement matters, Paul van der Beek, and had brought him up to date. In a subsequent conversation with the Ambassador, van der Beek indicated he had spoken to Joustra, who said he would urge the Interior Ministry to take action on our traffic barrier request.

(U) 9. A diplomatic note was sent to the GONL requesting increased security and timely notification. The text of the note is as follows: "In view of the series of alarming surveillance incidents involving U.S. interests and the dramatic increase in significant threat information acquired by the Government of the Netherlands in recent weeks, the Embassy of the United States of America requests that the Government of the Netherlands act immediately to install a temporary anti-ram barrier on the Korte Voorhout, replacing the existing plastic barriers. The City of the Hague has indicated that, although favorably disposed towards our multiple requests for a system of anti-ram bollards, no decision will be taken until September at the earliest. For this reason, and in light of the current security environment, we ask for metal or concrete traffic barriers, as an urgent, interim protection measure. The Embassy of the United States also takes note of significant past delays in apprising us of important security incidents such as hostile surveillance of the chancery. We recognize and appreciate that there has been a deliberate effort to improve information sharing and a recent incident was reported in a more timely fashion. We request that any information with a possible bearing on the security of U.S. facilities, personnel and citizens be reported in full without any delay. We recognize that early information is often fragmentary and inaccurate, but strongly prefer quick notification and urge the Government of the Netherlands to fully avail itself of the counter-terrorism resources of the U.S. by requesting checks of our databases.

(U) 10. The RSO briefed the EAC on his actions to request increased security measures from the GONL. The RSO has contacted the Deputy Director of Protocol for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to inform him that post would be sending a diplomatic note and requested his support for pushing for increased perimeter security. The RSO contacted the Director of Crises Management and Security Matters to request his support for posts' official request for increased perimeter security and in gaining support from the municipality.

(U) 11. The ARSO briefed the EAC on her actions to request increased security measures from the GONL. The ARSO contacted

the Deputy Director of the Dutch Public Order Police (BOB), responsible for fixed observational posts located at diplomatic and Dutch government facilities. The BOB has extensive camera monitors that they monitor. The ARSO requested a signal/feed from the BOB cameras to augment the Embassy's view of the exterior perimeter.

(S/NF) 12. Subsequent to the EAC meeting, FBI LEGATT Brussels arrived from a meeting with the KLPD and the prosecutor supervising the investigation regarding the Saudi/Somali surveillance incident on July 26, 2004. LEGATT advised the EAC security subcommittee that the two surveillants, along with two other identified individuals, had been arrested this afternoon. Authorities promised LEGATT additional information as it becomes available.

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